A minimal core calculus for Solidity contracts by Bartoletti, Massimo et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
8.
02
70
9v
1 
 [c
s.P
L]
  6
 A
ug
 20
19
A minimal core calculus for Solidity contracts
Massimo Bartoletti1, Letterio Galletta2, and Maurizio Murgia1,3
1 Universita` degli Studi di Cagliari, Cagliari, Italy
2 IMT Lucca, Lucca, Italy
3 Universita` di Trento, Trento, Italy
Abstract. The Ethereum platform supports the decentralized execution
of smart contracts, i.e. computer programs that transfer digital assets be-
tween users. The most common language used to develop these contracts
is Solidity, a Javascript-like language which compiles into EVM bytecode,
the language actually executed by Ethereum nodes. While much research
has addressed the formalisation of the semantics of EVM bytecode, rela-
tively little attention has been devoted to that of Solidity. In this paper
we propose a minimal calculus for Solidity contracts, which extends an
imperative core with a single primitive to transfer currency and invoke
contract procedures. We build upon this formalisation to give semantics
to the Ethereum blockchain. We show our calculus expressive enough to
reason about some typical quirks of Solidity, like e.g. re-entrancy.
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1 Introduction
A paradigmatic feature of blockchain platforms is the ability to execute “smart”
contracts, i.e. computer programs that transfer digital assets between users, with-
out relying on a trusted authority. In Ethereum [5] — the most prominent smart
contracts platform so far — contracts can be seen as concurrent objects [15]:
they have an internal mutable state, and a set of procedures to manipulate it,
which can be concurrently called by multiple users. Additionally, each contract
controls an amount of crypto-currency, that it can exchange with other users and
contracts. Users interact with contracts by sending transactions, which represent
procedure calls, and may possibly involve transfers of crypto-currency from the
caller to the callee. The sequence of transactions on the blockchain determines
the state of each contract, and the balance of each user.
Ethereum supports contracts written in a Turing-complete language, called
EVM bytecode [8]. Since programming at the bytecode level is inconvenient,
developers seldom use EVM bytecode directly, but instead write contracts in
higher-level languages which compile into bytecode. The most common of these
languages is Solidity [1], a Javascript-like language supported by the Ethereum
Foundation. There is a growing literature on the formalization of Solidity, which
roughly can be partitioned in two approaches, according to the distance from
the formal model to the actual language. One approach is to include as large a
subset of Solidity as possible, while the other is to devise a core calculus that
is as small as possible, capturing just the features of Solidity that are relevant
to some specific task. In general, the first approach has more direct practical
applications: for instance, a formal semantics very close to that of the actual
Solidity can be the basis for developing precise analysis and verification tools.
Although diverse in nature, the motivations underlying the second approach are
not less strong. The main benefit of omitting almost all the features of the full
language is that by doing so we simplify rigorous reasoning. This simplification is
essential for the development of new proof techniques (e.g., axiomatic semantics),
static analysis techniques (e.g., data and control flow analysis, type systems), as
well as for the study of language expressiveness (e.g., rigorous comparisons and
encodings to/from other languages). The co-existence of these two approaches
is common in computer science: for instance, the formalization of Java gave rise
of a lot of research since the mid 90s, producing Featherweight Java [9] as the
most notable witness of the “minimalistic” approach.
Contribution In this paper we pursue the minimalistic approach, by introduc-
ing a core calculus for smart contracts. Our calculus, called TinySol (for “Tiny
Solidity”), features an imperative core, which we extend with a single construct
to call contracts and transfer currency. This construct, inspired by Solidity “ex-
ternal” calls, captures the most paradigmatic aspect of smart contracts, i.e. the
exchange of digital assets according to programmable rules. Slightly diverging
from canonical presentations of imperative languages, we use key-value stores
to represent the contract state, so abstracting and generalising Solidity state
variables. We formalise the semantics of TinySol in Section 2, using a big-step
operational style. In Section 3 we show TinySol expressive enough to reproduce
reentrancy attacks, one of the typical quirks of Solidity; the succinctness of these
proofs witnesses an advantage of our minimalistic approach. In Section 4 we
refine our formalization, by giving semantics to transactions and blockchains.
In Section 5 we exemplify TinySol through a variety of complex contracts, rang-
ing from wallets, to escrow services, lotteries, and Ponzi schemes. Aiming at
minimality, TinySol makes several simplifications w.r.t. Solidity: in Section 6 we
discuss the main differences between the two languages.
Related work Besides ours, the only other Solidity-inspired minimal core cal-
culus we are aware of is Featherweight Solidity (FS) [6]. Similarly to our TinySol,
FS focusses on the most basic features of Solidity, i.e. transfers of cryptocurrency
and external calls, while omitting other language features, like e.g. internal and
delegate calls, function modifiers, and the gas mechanism. The main difference
between TinySol and FS is stylistic: while our design choice was to start from a
basic imperative language, and extend it with a single contract-oriented primitive
(external calls), FS follows the style of Featherweight Java, modelling function
bodies as expressions. Compared to our calculus, FS also includes the dynamic
creation of contracts, and a type system which detects some run-time errors. A
further difference is that FS models blockchains as functions from contract iden-
tifiers to states; instead, we represent a blockchain as a sequence of transactions,
and then we reconstruct the state by giving a semantics to this sequence. In this
way we can reason e.g. about re-orderings of transactions, forks, etc.
A few papers pursue the approach of formalising large fragments of Solidity.
The work [19] proposes a big-step operational semantics for several Solidity con-
structs, including e.g. access to memory and storage, inheritance, internal and
external calls, and function modifiers. The formalization also deals with com-
plex data types, like structs, arrays and mappings. The works [10,18] propose
tour-de-force formalizations of larger fragments of Solidity, also including a gas
mechanism. Both [19] and [18] mechanize their semantics in the Coq proof assis-
tant, while [10] uses the K-Framework [14]. The work [13] extends the semantics
of [10] to encompass also exceptions and return values.
2 TinySol syntax and semantics
We assume a set Val of values v, k, . . ., a set Const of constant names x, y, . . .,
a set of procedure names f, g, . . .. and a set Addr of addresses X,Y, . . ., par-
titioned into account addresses A,B, . . . and contract addresses C,D, . . .. We
write sequences in bold, e.g. v is a sequence of values; ǫ is the empty sequence.
We use n, n′, . . . to range over N, and b, b′, . . . to range over boolean values.
A contract is a finite set of terms of the form f(x){S }, where S is a statement,
with syntax in Figure 1. Intuitively, each term f(x){S } represents a contract
procedure, where f is the procedure name, x are its formal parameters (omitted
when empty), and S is the procedure body. Each contract has a key-value store,
which we model as a partial function from keys k ∈ Val to values v ∈ Val.
Statements extend those of a basic imperative language with three constructs:
– throw raises an uncatchable exception, rolling-back the state;
– k:=E updates the key-value store, binding the key k to the value denoted by
the expression E ;
– X : f(v)$n calls the procedure f (with actual parameters v) of the contract
at address X, transferring n units of currency to X.
The expressions used within statements (Figure 1, right) can be constants
(e.g., integers, booleans, strings), addresses, and operations between expressions.
We assume that all the usual arithmetic, logic and cryptographic operators are
provided (since their definition is standard, we will not detail them). The expres-
sion !k evaluates to true if the key k is bound in the contract store, otherwise
it evaluates to false . The expression ?k denotes the value bound to the key k
in the contract store. The expression X : E evaluates E in the context of the
address X. For instance, X : ?k denotes the value bound to k in the store of X.
We assume a mapping Γ from addresses to contracts, such that Γ (A) =
{fskip(){skip}} for all account addresses A. This allows for a uniform treatment
of account and contract addresses: indeed, calling a procedure on an account ad-
dress A can only result in a pure currency transfer to A, since the procedure can
only perform a skip. We further postulate that: (i) expressions and statements
are well-typed: e.g., guards in conditionals and in loops have type bool; (ii) the
S ::= statement
skip skip
| throw exception
| E :=E ′ store update
| S ;S ′ sequence
| ifE thenS else S ′ conditional
| whileE do S loop
| E0 : f(E1)$E2 call
E ::= expression
v value
| x const name
| X address
| op E operator
| ?E key lookup
| !E key bound?
| X : E context
Fig. 1: Syntax of TinySol.
procedures in Γ (C) have distinct names; (iii) the key balance cannot stay at the
left of an assignment; (iv) the constant names sender and value cannot stay in
the formal parameters of a procedure.
We use the following syntactic sugar. For a call X : f(v)$n, when there is no
money transfer (i.e., n = 0) we just write it as X : f(v); when the target is an
account address A (so, the call is to the procedure fskip), we write it as A$n.
We write ifE thenS for ifE thenS else skip.
The semantics of contracts is given in terms of a function from states to
states. A state σ : Addr → (Val ⇀ Val) maps each address to a key-value
store, i.e. a partial function from values (keys) to values. We use the standard
brackets notation for representing finite maps: for instance, {v1/x1, · · · , vn/xn}
maps xi to vi, for i ∈ 1..n. When a key k is not bound to any value in σX,
we write σ X k = ⊥. We postulate that domσA = {balance} for all account
addresses A, and domσC ⊇ {balance} for all contract addresses C. A qualified
key is a term of the form X.k. We write σ(X.k) for σXk.
A state update π : Addr ⇀ (Val ⇀ Val) is a substitution from qualified
keys to values; we denote with {v/X.k} the state update which maps X.k to v.
We define keys(π) as the set of qualified keys X.k such that X ∈ domπ and
k ∈ domπX. We apply updates to states as follows:
(σπ)X = δX where δXk =
{
πXk if X.k ∈ keys(π)
σXk otherwise
We define the auxiliary operators σ + X : n and σ − X : n on states, which,
respectively, increase/decrease the balance of X of n currency units:
σ ◦ X : n = σ{(σXbalance) ◦n/X.balance} (◦ ∈ {+,−})
Example 1. Let σ be a state which maps X to the store δX = {0/k0, 1/k1}. Let
π = {2/X.k0} and π′ = {3/X.k2} be state updates. We have (σπ)X = {2/k0, 1/k1},
(σπ′)X = {0/k0, 1/k1, 3/k2}, and (σπ)Y = (σπ′)Y = σY for all Y 6= X.
We give the operational semantics of statements in a big-step style. The
semantics of a statement S is parameterised over a state σ, an address X
JvKXσ,ρ = v JxK
X
σ,ρ = ρ x JYK
X
σ,ρ = Y JopE K
X
σ,ρ = op JE K
X
σ,ρ JY : E K
X
σ,ρ = JE K
Y
σ,ρ
J?E KXσ,ρ = σ X (JE K
X
σ,ρ) J!E K
X
σ,ρ =
{
true if JE KXσ,ρ 6= ⊥ and σ X (JE K
X
σ,ρ) 6= ⊥
false if JE KXσ,ρ 6= ⊥ and σ X (JE K
X
σ,ρ) = ⊥
JskipKXσ,ρ = σ
JE KXσ,ρ = k JE
′KXσ,ρ = v
JE :=E ′KXσ,ρ = σ{v/X.k}
JE KXσ,ρ = b ∈ {true , false}
JifE then S true else S falseK
X
σ,ρ = JS bK
X
σ,ρ
JS0K
X
σ,ρ = σ
′
JS0; S1K
X
σ,ρ = JS1K
X
σ′,ρ
JE KXσ,ρ = false
JwhileE doS KXσ,ρ = σ
JE KXσ,ρ = true JS K
X
σ,ρ = σ
′
JwhileE do S KXσ,ρ = JwhileE doS K
X
σ′,ρ
JE0K
X
σ,ρ = Y
JE1K
X
σ,ρ = v1 · · · vh
JE2K
X
σ,ρ = n ≤ σ X balance
f(x1 · · ·xh){S } ∈ Γ (Y)
σ′ = σ − X : n + Y : n
ρ′ = {X/sender, n/value, v1/x1, · · · , vh/xh}
JE0 : f(E1)$E2K
X
σ,ρ = JS K
Y
σ′, ρ′
Fig. 2: Semantics of statements and expressions.
contract wherein S is evaluated), and an environment ρ : Const ⇀ Val, used
to evaluate the formal parameters and the special names sender and value.
Executing S may affect both the store of X and, in case of procedure calls,
also the store of other contracts. Instead, the semantics of an expression is a
value; so, expressions have no side effects. We assume that all the semantic
operators are strict, i.e. their result is ⊥ if some operand is ⊥. We denote by
JS KXσ,ρ the semantics of a statement S in a given state σ, environment ρ, and
address X, where the partial function J·KXσ,ρ is defined by the inference rules
in Figure 2. We write JS KXσ,ρ = ⊥ when the semantics of S is not defined.
The semantics of expressions is straightforward; note that we use op to denote
syntactic operators, and op for their semantic counterpart. The environment ρ is
used to evaluate constant names x, while the state σ is used to evaluate !E and
?E . The semantics of statements is mostly standard, except for the last rule.
A procedure call E0 : f(E1)$E 2 within X has a defined semantics iff: (i) E 0
evaluates to an address Y; (ii) E 2 evaluates to a non-negative number n, not
exceeding the balance of X; (iii) the contract at Y has a procedure named f with
formal parameters x1 · · ·xh; (iv) E1 evaluates to a sequence of values of length
h. If all these conditions hold, then the procedure body S is executed in a state
where X’s balance is decreased by n, Y’s balance is increased by n, and in an
environment where the formal parameters are bound to the actual ones, and the
special names sender and value are bound, respectively, to X (the caller) and
n (the value transferred to Y).
Example 2. Consider the following statements, to be evaluated within a contract
C in a store σ where σCk = ⊥:
?k:=1 k:=?k if!?k thenk:=0 elsek:=1
throw ?k:=1; skip whiletruedo skip
We have that: (a) ?k:=1 evaluates to ⊥ because the first premise of the assign-
ment rule is not satisfied, as the lhs of the assignment evaluates to ⊥; (b) simi-
larly, k:=?k evaluates to ⊥ because the second premise is not satisfied, as the rhs
evaluates to ⊥; (c) if!?k thenk:=0 elsek:=1 evaluates to ⊥, because the se-
mantics of the guard is ⊥; (d) since there are no semantic rules for throw, implic-
itly this means that its semantics is undefined; (e) ?k:=1; skip is a sequence of
two commands, where the first command evaluates to ⊥. The rule for sequences
requires that the first command evaluates to some state σ′, while this is not the
case for ?k:=1. Therefore, the premise of the rule does not hold, and so the overall
command evaluates to ⊥; (f) finally, whiletrue do skip evaluates to ⊥, because
there exists no (finite) derivation tree which infers Jwhile truedo skipKCσ,ρ = σ.
Summing up, all the statements above have an undefined semantics. In practice,
the semantic rules for transactions (see Section 4) ensure that the effects of any
transaction whose statement evaluates to ⊥ will be reverted (see e.g. Example 6).
Example 3 (Wallet). Consider the following procedures of the contract at C:
f() {if sender = A thenskipelse throw}
g(x, y) {if sender = A && value = 0&&?balance ≥ x then y$x else throw}
The procedure f allows A to deposit funds to the contract; dually, g allows A
to transfer funds to other addresses. The guard sender = A ensures that only
A can invoke the procedures of C; calls from other addresses result in a throw,
which leaves the state of C unchanged (in particular, throw reverts the currency
transfer from sender to C). The procedure g also checks that no currency is
transferred along with the contract call (value = 0), and that the balance of
C is enough (?balance ≥ x). Let S g be the body of g, let σ be such that
σCbalance = 3, and let ρ = {A/sender, 0/value, 2/x,B/y}. We have:
JS gK
C
σ,ρ = Jy$xK
C
σ,ρ = Jy : fskip()$xK
C
σ,ρ = JskipK
B
σ−C:2+B:2, {C/sender,1/value}
= σ − C : 2 +B : 2
Note that JS gK
C
σ,ρ = ⊥ if σCbalance < 2, or ρsender 6= A, or ρvalue 6= 0.
3 Digression: modelling re-entrancy
We now show how to express in TinySol re-entrancy, a subtle features of Solidity
which was exploited in the famous “DAO Attack” [3,12].
Example 4 (Harmless re-entrancy). Consider the following procedures:
f(x, b){if b then{D : g(); x$value}} ∈ Γ (C)
g(){sender : f(B, false)} ∈ Γ (D)
Intuitively, f first calls g, and then transfers value units of currency to the
address x. The procedure g attempts to change the currency recipient by calling
back f, setting the parameter x to B. We prove that this attack fails. Let S =
C : f(A, true)$1. For all σ and ρ such that σCbalance = 1, we have:
JS KXσ,ρ = Jif b then {D : g(); x$value}K
C
σ,ρ′ (ρ
′ = {C/sender, 1/value, true/b,A/x})
= JD : g(); x$valueKCσ,ρ′
= Jx$valueKCσ′,ρ′ (σ
′ = JD : g()KCσ,ρ′)
= σ′ − C : 1 + A : 1
where σ′ = JD : g()KCσ,ρ′
= Jsender : f(B, false)KDσ,{C/sender,0/value}
= Jif b then {D : g(); x$value}KCσ,ρ′′ (ρ
′′ = {D/sender, 0/value, false/b,B/x})
= JskipKCσ,ρ′′ = σ
Since σ′ = σ, we conclude that JS KCσ,ρ = σ − C : 1 + A : 1. So, g has failed its
attempt to divert the currency transfer to B. ⊓⊔
Example 5 (Vicious re-entrancy). Consider the following procedures:
f(){if not!k &&?balance ≥ 1 then {D : g()$1; k:=true} } ∈ Γ (C)
g(){C : f()} ∈ Γ (D)
Intuitively, f would like to transfer 1 ether to D, by calling g. The guard not!k
is intended to ensure that the transfer happens at most once. Let σ be such
that σCbalance = n ≥ 1 and σCk = ⊥, and let ρ = {D/sender, 0/value}, ρ′ =
{C/sender, 1/value}. Let S f and S g be the bodies of f and g. We have:
JS fK
C
σ,ρ = JD : g()$1; k:=trueK
C
σ,ρ = Jk:=trueK
C
σ1,ρ
σ1 = JD : g()$1K
C
σ,ρ = JSgK
D
σ−C:1+D:1,ρ′ = JS fK
C
σ−C:1+D:1,ρ
= JD : g()$1; k:=trueKCσ−C:1+D:1,ρ
= Jk:=trueKCσ2,ρ
σ2 = JD : g()$1K
C
σ−C:1+D:1,ρ = JS gK
D
σ−C:2+D:2,ρ′ = Jk:=trueK
C
σ3,ρ
σi = Jk:=trueK
C
σi+1,ρ (for i ∈ 3 . . . n− 1)
σn = JskipK
C
σ−C:n+D:n,ρ = σ − C : n+D : n
Summing up, JS fK
C
σ,ρ = (σ − C : n +D : n){true/k}, i.e. D has drained all the
currency from C. ⊓⊔
4 Transactions and blockchains
A transaction T is a term of the form A
n
−→ C : f(v), where A is the address of
the caller, C is the address of the called contract, f is the called procedure, n is
the value transferred from A to C, and v is the sequence of actual parameters.
The semantics of T in a given state σ, is a new state σ′ = JTKσ . The function
J·Kσ is defined by the following rules:
f(x){S } ∈ Γ (C) σA balance ≥ n JS KCσ−A:n+C:n, {A/sender,n/value,v/x} = σ
′
JA
n
−→ C : f(v)Kσ = σ′
[Tx1]
f(x){S } ∈ Γ (C)
(
σA balance < n or JS KCσ−A:n+C:n, {A/sender,n/value,v/x} = ⊥
)
JA
n
−→ C : f(v)Kσ = σ
[Tx2]
Rule [Tx1] handles the case where the transaction is successful: this happens
when A’s balance is at least n, and the procedure call terminates in a non-
error state. Note that n units of currency are transferred to C before starting to
execute f, and that the names sender and value are set, respectively, to A and
n. Instead, [Tx2] applies either when A’s balance is not enough, or the execution
of f fails (this also covers the case when f does not terminate). In these cases,
T does not alter the state, i.e. σ′ = σ.
A blockchain B is a finite sequence of transactions. The semantics of B is
obtained by folding the semantics of its transactions:
JǫKσ = σ JTBKσ = JBKJTKσ
Note that erroneous transactions occuring in a blockchain have no effect on its
semantics (as rule [Tx2] makes them identities w.r.t. the append operation).
Example 6. Recall the contract C from Example 3, and let B = T0T1T0, where:
T0 = A
3
−→ C : f() T1 = A
0
−→ C : g(2,B)
Let S f and S g be the bodies of f and g, respectively. σAbalance = 5 and
σCbalance = 0. By rule [Tx1] we have that:
JT0Kσ = JS fK
C
σ−A:3+C:3,{A/sender,3/value} = JskipK
C
σ−A:3+C:3,{A/sender,3/value}
= σ −A : 3 + C : 3
Now, let σ′ = σ −A : 3 + C : 3. By rule [Tx1] we have that:
JT1Kσ′ = JS gK
C
σ′,{A/sender,0/value,2/x,B/y} = Jy$xK
C
σ′,{A/sender,0/value,2/x,B/y}
= σ′ − C : 2 +B : 2
Let σ′′ = σ′ − C : 2 +B : 2. By rule [Tx2], we obtain JBKσ = JT0Kσ′′ = σ
′′.
5 Additional examples
In this section we illustrate the expressiveness of TinySol through a series of
examples.
5.1 An extended wallet
In Figure 3 we refine the wallet contract in Example 3, by keeping track in the
store of the amount of money transferred to each user.
The contract TinyWallet has two procedures: init, which initializes the
contract owner, and pay, which transfers amount units of currency from the
contract to the account dst.
The procedure init checks at line 4 if the key owner is defined; if not,
it means that the contract is still in the initial state where all keys (except
balance) are undefined, and in this case it binds the key owner to the sender
of the transaction.
The procedure pay requires at line 8 that (i) the caller is the contract
owner, (ii) the caller does not transfer any currency along with the call, and (iii) the
contract balance is enough. If any of these conditions does not hold, the proce-
dure throws an exception. At line 10, if dst is not bound yet in the store, then
it is set to amount. Otherwise, at line 11 the old value is incremented by amount.
Finally, line 12 transfers amount units of currency to the recipient.
1 contract TinyWallet {
2
3 init() {
4 if !owner then throw else owner := sender
5 }
6
7 pay(amount,dst) {
8 if (sender /= ?owner || value /=0 || amount > ?balance) then throw
9 else {
10 if not !dst then dst := amount
11 else dst := ?dst + amount;
12 dst $ amount
13 }
14 }
15 }
Fig. 3: An extended wallet contract.
5.2 An escrow contract
In Figure 4 we specify in TinySol a simple escrow contract, which allows a buyer
to deposit some funds to the contract and later authorize their transfer to a
seller. Further, the seller can authorize a full refund to the buyer, in case
there is some problem with the purchase. If buyer and seller do not find an
agreement, they can resort to an external authority, which decides how the initial
deposit is split among them (retaining a fee).
The procedure init initializes three keys: buyer (the sender of the transac-
tion), seller and oracle (passed as parameters). The guard !buyer ensures
that init can be called at most once. The procedures pay and refund autho-
rize, respectively, the fund transfer to the seller or to the buyer; their guards
1 contract TinyEscrow
2 {
3 init(x,y) {
4 if !buyer then throw
5 else { buyer := sender; seller := x; oracle := y }
6 }
7 pay() {
8 if sender /= ?buyer then throw else ?seller $ ?balance
9 }
10 refund() {
11 if sender /= ?seller then throw else ?buyer $ ?balance
12 }
13 dispute() {
14 if (sender /= ?buyer && sender /= ?seller) then throw
15 else ?oracle.openDispute()
16 }
17 }
18
19 contract Oracle
20 {
21 init() { isOpen := false }
22
23 openDispute() {
24 if not ?isOpen then {
25 isOpen := true;
26 escrow := sender
27 }
28 }
29 closeDispute(z) {
30 if sender /= AOracle then throw
31 else if ?isOpen {
32 fee := ?escrow:?balance * 0.01;
33 ?escrow:?buyer $ (?escrow:?balance - ?fee) * z;
34 ?escrow:?seller $ ?escrow:?balance;
35 ?fee $ AOracle;
36 isOpen := false
37 }
38 }
39 }
Fig. 4: An escrow contract using an oracle.
ensure that a participant cannot authorize a transfer to herself. Either buyer
and seller can call dispute, which in turns calls the procedure openDispute
of the contract at address oracle.
A possible contract with this procedure is Oracle in Figure 4: there, the
procedure openDispute just binds the key escrow to the address of the contract
caller (TinyEscrow). The oracle resolves the dispute by calling the procedure
closeDispute: its parameter z is the fraction of the deposit which goes to the
buyer; 1% of the deposit goes to the oracle as fee. Note that, if buyer or seller
call pay or refund before the oracle calls closeDispute, then the effect of the
first four instructions within the else branch of closeDispute is null (since
balance is zero), and the invocation just results in the closure of the dispute.
5.3 A two-players lottery
In Figure 5 we code in TinySol a two-players lottery, inspired by the one in [2].
The players p1 and p2 bet 1 unit of currency each; additionally, they deposit
1 contract TinyLottery
2 {
3 init() { nPlayers := 0 }
4
5 join(h) {
6 if (?nPlayers = 2 || value /= 3) then throw
7 else if ?nPlayers = 0
8 then { p1 := sender; h1 := h, nPlayers := 1; t0 := Clock:time+1000 }
9 else if (h = ?h1) then throw
10 else { p2 := sender; h2 := h, nPlayers := 2 }
11 }
12 leave() {
13 if (sender = ?p1 && ?nPlayers = 1 && Clock:time > t0)
14 then { ?p1 $ ?balance; nPlayers := 0; }
15 else throw
16 }
17 reveal(s) {
18 if (?nPlayers /= 2) then throw
19 else if (sender = ?p1 && hash(s) = ?h1 && not !s1) then {s1 := s; ?p1 $ 2}
20 else if (sender = ?p2 && hash(s) = ?h2 && not !s2) then {s2 := s; ?p2 $ 2}
21 else throw
22 }
23 win() {
24 if (!s1 && !s2)
25 then if ((?s1 + ?s2) %2 = 0) then ?p1 $ 2 else ?p2 $ 2
26 else if (!s1 && Clock:time > t0) then ?p1 $ 2
27 else if (!s2 && Clock:time > t0) then ?p2 $ 2
28 else throw
29 }
30 }
Fig. 5: A two-players lottery.
2 units of currency as collateral, which are used as compensation in case of
dishonest behaviour. The procedure join allows the players to join the lottery;
the parameter h is the hash of a secret, used to implement a timed commitment
protocol, similarly to [2]. The check h = ?h1 at line 7 serves to avoid an attack
where the second player replays the same hash of the first one. The procedure
leave allows the first player to leave the lottery, if no other player joins before
time t0. Note that time is provided by an oracle, modelled by the contract Clock
(not displayed in the figure). The procedure reveal allows both players to reveal
their secrets: when this happens, the player redeems her collateral. Finally, the
procedure win determines the winner of the lottery, who will collect the bets. If
both players have revealed their secrets, then the winner is p1 or p2, depending
on the parity of the sum of the secrets. Otherwise, one player can redeem the
bets if she has revealed her secret and the deadline t0 has passed.
5.4 A Ponzi scheme
In Figure 6 we implement a Ponzi scheme, i.e. a contract where users invest
money, and can redeem their investment (plus interests) if enough users invest
enough money in the contract afterwards. In particular, we consider a scheme
which pays back users in order of arrival; this kind of Ponzi schemes gained some
popularity in the early stage of Ethereum, with dozens of different instances.
1 contract TinyPonzi
2 {
3 init() {
4 if !owner then throw
5 else { owner := sender;
6 n := 0; // total number of investors
7 p := 0 // number of paid investors
8 }
9 }
10 join() {
11 if (value < 1 || not !owner) then throw
12 else {
13 ?n := (sender,value);
14 n := ?n + 1;
15 value/10 $ ?owner;
16 while (?p < ?n && ?balance >= 2*snd(??p)) do {
17 2*snd(??p) $ fst(??p);
18 p := ?p + 1
19 }
20 }
21 }
22 }
Fig. 6: A Ponzi scheme.
The procedure init sets the contract owner, and initializes to 0 the key n,
which counts the total number of investors, and p, which counts the number
of investors who have been paid. The procedure join allows users to invest
money, and distributes the new investment among all the other users who have
not been paid so far. The procedure exploits the key-value store to maintain an
array of investors. At line 14, the key ?n (i.e., the current value bound to n) is
bound to a pair, which contains the address of the new investor, and the invested
amount. We use fst and snd to access the first and second element of a pair,
respectively. When a new user joins the scheme, the owner receives 1/10 of the
value transferred along with the call (line 16). At lines 17-19, the procedure
scans the array of unpaid users, starting from the oldest entry. As long as the
balance is enough, each user receives twice the amount she invested. Note that
?p denotes the value bound to p (i.e., the index of the first unpaid user), while
??p denotes the pair (sender, value) associated to that user.
6 Conclusions
We have introduced TinySol, a minimal core contract calculus inspired by Solid-
ity. While our calculus is focussed on a single new construct to call contracts and
transfer currency, other languages have been proposed to capture other peculiar
aspects of smart contracts. Some of these language are domain-specific, e.g. for
financial contracts [4,7] and for business processes [11,17], while some others are
more abstract, modelling contracts as automata with guarded transitions [13,16].
Establishing the correctness of the compilation from these languages to Solidity
would be one of the possible applications of a bare bone formal model, like our
TinySol. Another possible application of a minimal calculus is the investigation
of different styles of semantics, like e.g. denotational and axiomatic semantics.
Further, the study of analysis and optimization techniques for smart contracts
may take advantage of a succinct formalization like ours.
Differences between TinySol and Solidity Aiming at minimality, TinySol
simplifies or neglects several features of Solidity. A first difference is that we do
not model a gas mechanism. In Ethereum, when sending a transaction, users
deposit into it some crypto-currency, to be paid to the miner which appends the
transaction to the blockchain. Each computation step performed by the miner
consumes part of this deposit; when the deposit reaches zero, the miner stops
executing the transaction. At this point, all the effects of the transaction (except
the payment to the miner) are rolled back. Although in TinySol we do not model
the gas mechanism, we still ensure that non-terminating calls have an undefined
semantics (see e.g. Example 2), so that they are rolled back by rule [Tx2]. The
semantics of TinySol could be easily extended with an “abstract” gas model,
by associating a cost to instructions and recording the gas consumption in the
environment. However, note that any gas mechanism formalized at the level
of abstraction of Solidity would not faithfully reflect the actual Ethereum gas
mechanism, where the cost of instructions are defined at the EVM bytecode level.
Indeed, compiler optimizations would make it hard to establish a correspondence
between the cost of a piece of Solidity code and the cost of its compiled bytecode.
Still, an abstract gas model could be useful in practice, e.g. to establish upper
bounds to the gas consumption of a piece of Solidity code.
A second difference is that our model assumes the set of contracts to be fixed,
while in Ethereum new contracts can be created at run-time. As a consequence,
TinySol does not feature constructors that are called when the contract is created.
Dynamic contract creation could be formalized by extending our model with
special transactions which extends the mapping Γ with the contracts generated
at run-time. Once this is done, adding constructors is standard.
In Ethereum, contracts can implement time constraints by using the block
publication time, accessible via the variable block.timestamp. In TinySol we
do not record timestamps in the blockchain. Still, time constraints can be im-
plemented by using oracles, i.e. contracts which allow certain trusted parties to
set their keys (e.g., timestamps), and make them accessible to other contracts
(see e.g. the lottery contract in Section 5).
In Ethereum, when the procedure name specified in the transaction does
not match any of the procedures in the contract, a special unnamed “fallback”
procedure (with no arguments) is implicitly invoked. Extending TinySol with
this mechanism would be straightforward. Delegate and internal calls, which we
have omitted in TinySol, would be simple to model as well.
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